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Abstract 
In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals 
and ‘and’/‘but’/‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-
Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading 
of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their 
truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance 
manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ 
acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments a strong dissociation was 
found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and 
acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of 
this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed.  
 Keywords: Relevance, truth conditions, indicative conditionals, probability, acceptability, 
conjunctions 
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Relevance Effects on ‘And’, ‘But’, ‘Therefore’, and ‘If Then’ 
 The goal of the present paper is to investigate experimentally which cognitive 
assessments are affected by salient reason-relation readings of two conjoined sentences. 
Following the tradition in linguistics, philosophy and psychology, we will focus on truth, 
probability, and acceptability evaluations (Garmut, 1991; McCawley, 1993; Nickerson, 2015). 
For our target sentences, we have chosen indicative conditionals (e.g. ‘if it rains, then Sally’s 
birthday party will be ruined’) and ‘but’, ‘and’, and ‘therefore’ sentences (henceforth referred to 
as 'ABT sentences'). As we will explain in detail below, a focused comparison between these 
sentences allows us to investigate which aspects of their meaning are influenced by their reason-
relation reading. 
 The standard work of reference in this context is Grice’s (1989) seminal work. In that 
book, Grice was concerned with enforcing Modified Occam’s Razor as a methodological 
principle, according to which “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (p. 47). Grice’s 
central point was that when modeling the meaning of natural language content, we can keep the 
logic simple by distinguishing between the truth-conditional content of sentences and the 
different implicatures that enrich the truth-conditional content of sentences. In particular, Grice 
(1989) was concerned about things such as preventing that: 
1) we reject the truth table of the material implication (‘⊃’) as a model of the truth 
conditional content of indicative conditionals (see Table 1 below) based on the fact 
that natural language conditionals have a prominent reason-relation reading, 
according to which the antecedent is a reason for the consequent, 
Running head: Relevance Effects                                  4 
2) we reject the truth table of logical conjunction (‘∧’) based on the fact that natural 
language conjunctions have readings that indicate temporal succession and causal 
relations, and 
3) we reject logical conjunction as a model of the truth-conditional content of sentences 
involving ‘but’ and ‘therefore’ based on the salient reason-relation reading of natural 
language sentences in which they occur. 
Grice (1989) introduced a key distinction between conversational and conventional 
implicatures. These twin notions provided the means to explain how these various sentences 
could have a meaning that goes beyond their truth-conditional content. The notion of a 
conversational implicature was called upon to explain the pragmatic phenomenon that we often 
use words to convey a meaning that differs from what we literally say. For instance, when Julia 
responds that “I don’t like parties” to the question “Are you going to the party tonight?”, her 
interlocutor can infer that the message that Julia really intends to convey is that she won’t go to 
the party tonight (Blome-Tillmann, 2013). Grice’s (1989) project was to reconstruct such 
pragmatic inferences to the intended meaning rationally, based on maxims of informative, 
truthful, relevant, and clear communication that implement the goal of cooperative discourse.    
In addition, Grice (1989) also introduced the category of conventional implicatures to 
account for the cases, where it is not a feature of the utterance of a sentence in a particular 
context that invites an interpretation of the intended meaning that differs from the truth-
conditional content. In particular, Grice thought that it was part of the conventional meaning of 
‘therefore’ to introduce a consequence relation (e.g. ‘He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, 
brave’), which goes beyond the sentence's truth conditions as modeled by logical conjunction.  
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Another example is that sentences such as ‘she was poor but honest’ have been thought to 
express a contrast between being poor and honest since Frege (1892), which is not to be found in 
its truth-conditional equivalent ‘she was poor and honest’. Often the treatment of ‘but’ is left 
with this observation in the philosophical literature. In fact, the analysis of ‘but’ is a rich topic in 
linguistics, where at least four different readings are dissected. However, attempts have been 
undertaken to subsume these various readings under the prominent denial of expectation reading, 
where an implicit or explicit assumption is denied by the second clause (Iten, 2000, Chap. 5; 
Blackmore, 2004, Chap. 4), which is closely related to a reason-relation reading. 
 Common to both conversational and conventional implicatures is the expectation that 
their content will not affect the truth-conditional content of the sentences in which they occur 
(Potts, 2015). Conversational implicatures and conventional implicatures differ in that only 
conversational implicatures can be cancelled (e.g. adding the qualification “I don’t like parties, 
but I would be happy to come tonight” cancels the conversational implicature that Julia won’t 
attend the party tonight). Furthermore, only conventional implicatures can be detached, or 
removed, by uttering a different sentence with the same truth-conditional content in the context 
of utterance (e.g. uttering “she was poor and honest” instead of “she was poor but honest”). 
Finally, only conversational implicatures can be reconstructed on the basis of Grice’s maxims of 
conversation (Blome-Tillmann, 2013).  
 It is not uncommon to find references to semantic and pragmatic modulation in the 
psychological literature (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002), or to invoke Grice’s theory to explain 
pragmatic effects (Nickerson, 2015). Given the prominent role that Grice’s thought continues to 
have on theorizing about natural language, it is important that its central claims are subjected to 
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empirical testing and do not just figure as ad hoc explanations that are invoked to explain 
divergent results when convenient.  
One natural assumption is that meaning components classified as conversational or 
conventional implicatures influence the acceptability/assertability assessments of the 
participants, while not affecting their truth evaluations. This implies a dissociation between the 
influence of factors relating to conversational and conventional implicatures on 
acceptability/assertability1 and truth-value assessments. Although probability assignments were 
not originally discussed in this context, we would expect them to vary in tandem with the 
acceptability judgments. 
As noted above, the ABT sentences have been thought to be truth-conditionally 
equivalent in the Frege/Grice tradition. In addition, therefore-sentences have a salient reason 
relation reading, whereby φ is a reason for ψ in “Nick forgot about her birthday (φ), therefore he 
didn’t buy Sally a present (ψ)”. In contrast, φ appears to be a reason against ψ in “Nick dislikes 
Sally (φ), but he attended her birthday party (anyway) (ψ)”. Finally, and-sentences seem to fall 
somewhere in between and can be used as a baseline for comparing these two extremes.  
In light of these assumed differences in reason-relation readings despite truth-conditional 
equivalence, comparing the ABT sentences on their truth, probability, and acceptability 
evaluations will give us important clues about whether the abovementioned dissociation can be 
found. If the differences in their reason-relation reading are attributable to implicatures, then 
these differences should only show up in their acceptability evaluations and probability 
evaluations. Yet their truth evaluations should remain unaffected. If, on the contrary, the 
                                                 
1  In this paper we will not distinguish the two.  
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assumption is wrong that the ABT sentences only differ in their implicatures, then we should see 
evidence of their different reason-relations readings affecting truth evaluations.   
There is a long tradition in the psychology of reasoning of investigating truth conditions 
by presenting participants with the cells of truth tables in the truth-table task (for reviews, see 
Manktelow, 2012; Nickerson, 2015). However, in order to address the question of what range of 
cognitive evaluations the reason-relation reading affects, a measurement tool is needed to capture 
the presence and absence of specific reason relations and to be able to vary it orthogonally to the 
presence or absence of other psychological factors of interest.   
Reason Relations 
For the purpose of this paper, we will rely on Spohn’s (2012, Chap. 6) explication of 
reason relations. According to Spohn, the reason relation and the notion of epistemic relevance 
can be explicated as follows:  
THE ∆P RULE: ∆p = P(ψ | φ) – P(ψ | ¬φ)  
POSITIVE RELEVANCE/φ IS A REASON FOR ψ: ∆p > 0 
IRRELEVANCE: ∆p = 0 
NEGATIVE RELEVANCE/φ IS A REASON AGAINST ψ: ∆p < 0 
The underlying intuition is that relevant information changes the probability of the 
propositions that it concerns. The probabilistic change is here explicated through a comparison 
between conditioning on the information and conditioning on its negation. When such a 
comparison shows that φ increases the probability of ψ, then φ is said to be a reason for ψ. When 
it shows that φ decreases the probability of ψ, then φ is said to be a reason against ψ. Using 
these explications, we specify Grice’s conventional-implicature hypothesis as follows: sentences 
containing ‘φ therefore ψ’ differ from sentences containing the connective ‘φ and ψ’ in 
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suggesting that φ is a reason for ψ (∆p > 0), and sentences containing ‘φ but ψ’ differ from the 
latter in suggesting that φ is a reason against ψ (∆p < 0). 
In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016b), participants’ perceived reason 
relations and relevance were investigated for a large range of everyday contexts and empirical 
support for the explication of the reason relation above could be obtained. The stimulus materials 
used in the present study contains 12 scenarios with 12 different conditions, implementing all 
permutations of positive relevance (PO), negative relevance (NE), irrelevance (IR) and high (H) 
and low (L) prior probability within each scenario. For ∆p values ranging from -1 to 1, a pretest 
with 725 participants showed that the average ∆p was .32 for the positive relevance conditions, -
.27 for the negative relevance conditions, -.01 for the irrelevance conditions. Moreover, the 
pretest found that the average prior probability was ca. 70% for the high probability items and 
less than 30% for the low probability items. 
The scenarios used were designed to trigger the participants’ stereotypical assumptions 
about basic causal, functional, or behavioral information to implement the above relevance 
categories. For instance, one scenario text runs as follows: 
Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He has now gone inside but is still 
freezing and takes a bath. As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is likely to make a 
mess in the process, which he knows his mother dislikes. 
As verified in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b), the two sentences ‘Scott turns on the warm water’ 
and ‘Scott will be warm soon’ both have a high prior probability, and the first sentence raises the 
probability of the second (PO HH). Moreover, the sentence ‘Scott turns on the cold water’ has a 
low prior probability and it lowers the probability of ‘Scott will be warm soon’ (NE LH). Finally, 
in the absence of further information it seems reasonable to assume that ‘Scott’s friends are 
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roughly the same age as him’ has a high prior probability. Yet this sentence leaves the 
probability of the previous sentences unchanged and is therefore irrelevant for them. Now if ‘φ 
therefore ψ’ expresses positive relevance, then the sentence ‘Scott turns on the warm water 
therefore Scott will be warm soon’ should sound fine, and if ‘φ but ψ’ expresses negative 
relevance then the sentence ‘Scott turns on the warm water but Scott will be warm soon’ should 
sound rather strange. Conversely, the negative relevance version should sound better with ‘but’ 
(‘Scott turns on the cold water but Scott will be warm soon’) yet strange with ‘therefore’ (‘Scott 
turns on the cold water therefore Scott will be warm soon’).  
One area in which these explications have already been applied is in the empirical 
research on conditionals to which we now turn. As we shall see, indicative conditionals are 
another type of sentences which have a salient reason-relation reading, and there is currently a 
large theoretical interest in this field in diagnosing for which types of cognitive assessments the 
reason-relation reading plays a role. Accordingly, we will be interested in whether the same kind 
of dissociations predicted above with respect to the ABT sentences can be found for the 
cognitive evaluations of indicative conditionals. 
 Reason Relations and Indicative Conditionals 
Throughout the last 10-15 years, a new paradigm has been introduced to the psychology 
of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2013) with researchers turning to probabilistic competence 
models of reasoning and drawing on Bayesian formal epistemology (Pfeifer & Douven, 2014). In 
the study of conditionals, this paradigm-shift is reflected in the widespread endorsement of “the 
Equation”, the Ramsey Test, and the de Finetti truth table (see Table 1 below).   
THE EQUATION: P(if φ, then ψ) = P(ψ | φ) (Bennett, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 
2007).  
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THE RAMSEY TEST: Instead of calculating conditional probabilities by means of the ratio P(φ and ψ)/ 
P(φ), the participants are conjectured to evaluate conditional probabilities on the basis of the Ramsey 
test. The Ramsey test is a mental algorithm that temporarily adds the antecedent to the participant’s 
stock of beliefs, makes minimal changes to preserve consistency, and evaluates the consequent under 
its supposition (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in Elqayam and Over (2013), there are two direct sources of evidence 
supporting this approach to conditionals. First, it has long been known that the participants tend 
to judge the false antecedent cells of the truth table (⊥⊤, ⊥⊥) to be ‘irrelevant’ to the truth or 
falsity of the indicative conditional in the truth-table task (an effect known as “the defective truth 
table”). This defective truth table effect has been interpreted as direct evidence in favor of the de 
Finetti truth table (see Table 1), because it is hard to reconcile with accounts based on the 
material implication, which would require that the conditional is treated as true in the false 
antecedent cells (Over & Evans, 2003). Second, direct investigations of the probability of 
indicative conditionals have repeatedly supported the Equation. For example, P(ψ | φ) turns out 
to be a much better predictor of P(If φ, then ψ) than P(¬φ ∨ ψ,), the probability under the 
Table 1. Truth Tables of the Indicative Conditional  
Truth-Conditional Inferentialism 
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
Material Implication Account 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ 
De Finetti Table 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ void void void void void void 
Note. ‘⊤’ = true; ‘⊥’ = false; PO = positive relevance; NE = 
negative relevance; IR = irrelevance.  
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material implication interpretation (Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; 
Douven, 2015b, Chapters 3, 4). 
Despite this empirical support for The Equation, recent results have shown, however, that 
the relationship between P(if φ, then ψ) and P(ψ | φ) is moderated by the relevance manipulation 
reviewed above. Employing the above-described stimulus material, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2016a) showed that the marginal means of assessments of P(if φ, then ψ) were judged to be 
substantially lower in NE and IR than in the PO condition and that the slopes of the regression 
lines employing P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) were steeper in the PO condition. These 
results corroborate the idea that there is something defective about indicative conditionals that 
violate the default assumption of positive relevance. Thus whereas the sentence ‘If Scott turns on 
the warm water, then Scott will be warm soon’ (PO HH) has a high probability in the scenario 
above, sentences like ‘If Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him, then Scott will turn on 
the warm water’ (IR HH) and ‘If Scott makes an effort to be tidy, then the bathroom will be 
dirtier than before he took his bath’ (NE HH) have a much lower probability than what would be 
expected based on P(ψ | φ) alone.  
In earlier empirical work (Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Over, Hadjichristidis, 
Evans, Handley, and Sloman, 2007; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014), the ∆p rule was 
investigated in relation to probability evaluations of conditionals, with little or no evidence for a 
relationship. But the crucial difference from Skovgaard-Olsen et al.’s (2016a) original study 
consists in that these earlier studies did not systematically vary ∆p to be negative, equal to zero 
and positive for realistic stimulus materials. In addition, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) did not 
assume that P(if φ, then ψ) would be directly predicted by either ∆p or P(ψ | ¬φ) as its proxy. 
Instead a heuristic for judging P(if φ, then ψ) based on a reason relation assessment was 
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formulated according to which the presence of negative relevance or irrelevance would make the 
participants apply a penalty to P(if φ, then ψ) based on the conditionals’ perceived defect in 
expressing a reason relation. 
In philosophy, it has long been argued that indicative conditionals without connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent (e.g. ‘If Copenhagen is in Denmark, then H. C. 
Anderson is dead’) are defective (Spohn, 2013; Olsen, 2014; Douven, 2015a; Krzyżanowska, 
2015). This intuition has not, however, been integrated into contemporary treatments of 
conditionals in the psychology of reasoning based on either the classical treatment of 
conditionals as the material implication (‘⊃’), or by probabilistic accounts based on the de Finetti 
truth table and the Ramsey test (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a). 
As an alternative, Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven (2014) and Krzyżanowska 
(2015) argued that there should be an inferential relation (or reason relation) between the 
antecedent and the consequent as part of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. In 
Krzyżanowska (2015, p. 62), the presence of either an indicative, abductive, or deductive 
inferential relation between the antecedent and the consequent is made part of the truth 
conditions of indicative conditionals. Moreover, they allow for auxiliary assumptions coming 
from the participants’ background knowledge to play a role in determining the inferential 
relation and add further qualifications that need not concern us here. Based on this line of 
reasoning, truth-conditional inferentialism predicts that the modal truth value assignments 
should follow the first rows in Table 1. 
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One thing to note about the ‘True’ prediction for the ⊤⊥ cell is the following:2 according 
to Krzyżanowska (2015: Chap.. 3), the inferential relation between φ and ψ admits exceptions 
(i.e. the ⊤⊥ cells) via inductive or abductive consequence relations. Inductive consequence 
relations would be instances of probability-raising based on purely frequentist information. 
Abductive consequence relations would be instances of probability raising based on explanatory 
considerations (e.g. causal structures and theoretical assumptions). Most likely, the stimulus 
material reviewed above, and further specified in Table 2 below, instantiates the abductive 
consequence relation. But crucially, it is not based on the deductive consequence relation, which 
does not admit of exceptions (i.e. the ⊤⊥ cells). 
Note that whereas the Frege-Grice tradition is based on ignoring relevance differences 
between sentences in truth-value evaluations, truth-conditional inferentialism stands out by 
making predictions that directly vary with the levels of the relevance factor. In contrast, both the 
material implication and the de Finetti truth tables follow the Frege-Grice tradition in assigning 
truth conditions to indicative conditionals that are invariant across the different levels of the 
relevance factor (see Table 1).  
For both the ABT sentences and indicative conditionals, the main focus of our 
experiments is to investigate whether evidence for the hypothesized dissociation can be found 
that the reason relation readings of these sentences affect the acceptability and probability 
evaluations of these sentences, but not their truth evaluations. In order to investigate these issues, 
Experiment 1 sets out to introduce the relevance manipulation into the truth-table task and 
                                                 
2  Both Karolina Krzyżanowska and Igor Douven have confirmed that Table 1 is a 
reasonable explication of the definition cited above (personal communication, February, 2016). 
However, Karolina Krzyżanowska did express some doubts about her earlier proposed definition 
and expressed concerns that it is less clear whether truth conditional inferentialism is really 
committed to predicting True for the ⊤⊥ cell in the positive relevance condition. 
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Experiment 2 introduces the relevance manipulation into tasks that elicit the probability and 
acceptability judgments of our four target sentences. 
Experiment 1 
As discussed above, it is part of the dissociation predicted by the Frege-Grice tradition 
that the truth table of logical conjunction ‘∧’ fits the truth tables ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ 
therefore ψ’, and that no effect of the relevance conditions can be found for these three sentences 
(a hypothesis we denote as ‘H0_ABT’). Similarly, the material implication and de Finetti truth 
tables predict that no effect of the relevance condition should be found for ‘if φ, then ψ’ (a 
hypothesis we denote as ‘H0_IF’) and that the participants’ truth evaluations fit their respective 
truth tables (see Table 1). In contrast, truth-conditional inferentialism predicts that a relevance 
effect on the truth evaluations of ‘if φ, then ψ’ can be found, and that its respective truth table 
accurately describes participants’ modal responses. 
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet to obtain a large and demographically 
diverse sample. A total of 752 people completed the experiment. The participants were sampled 
through Mechanical Turk from USA, UK, and Australia and were paid a small amount of money 
for their participation.  
The following exclusion criteria were used: 1) not having English as native language, 2) 
failing to answer two simple SAT comprehension questions correctly in a warm-up phase, 3) 
completing the task in less than 160 seconds or in more than 3600 seconds, and 4) answering 
‘not serious at all’ to the question of how serious the participant would take his or her 
participation at the beginning of the study. The final sample consisted of 557 participants. Mean 
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age was 38 years, ranging from 18 to 75 years; 36 % of the participants were male; 72 % 
indicated that the highest level of education that they had completed was an undergraduate 
degree or higher. The demographic measures of the participants differed only minimally before 
and after the exclusion.  
Design 
The experiment involved a within-subject design. Specifically, there were three factors 
that were varied within participants: 1) sentence, with four levels: ‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, 
‘…therefore…’, ‘if…, then…’; 2) relevance, with three levels: PO, NE, and IR; and 3) priors, 
with four levels: HH, HL, LH, and LL (e.g. LH indicates that P(φ) = low and P(ψ) = high). The 
prior manipulation had the goal of ensuring that the participants’ truth evaluations were 
representative across different combinations of prior probabilities of the sentences in question.   
Materials  
The twelve within-participants conditions crossing the factors relevance and priors were 
randomly assigned to twelve different scenarios for each participant. Within each relevance 
level, each participant saw all four sentence levels randomly distributed across the priors 
manipulation. One participant might thus see the sentences ‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, 
‘…therefore…’, ‘if…, then…’ in the PO level in the HH, LH, LL, HL prior levels, whereas the 
next would see them in a different permutation of the priors factor. 
With minor adjustments, the twelve scenarios used in this study were obtained from a 
large pre-study (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016b).3 From each of the twelve selected scenarios we 
                                                 
3  These minor adjustments concern slight formulation changes to a few of the sentences 
and changing the temporal structure of all the sentences. Whereas the sentences in Skovgaard-
Olsen et al. (2016b) had the temporal form of ‘if φ occurs, then ψ will occur’, their temporal 
form was ‘if φ is now happening, then ψ will occur’ (or: ‘φ is now happening and/but/therefore 
ψ will occur’). The latter temporal form was introduced in the present study to allow for the 
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were able to construe all twelve within-participant conditions. Consequently, mapping of the 
condition to each possible scenario was completely randomized for each participant anew.  
To  better illustrate these differences, Table 2 contains all of the experimental conditions 
for the ‘Scott scenario’ presented in the Introduction here illustrated using the connective ‘And’. 
 
Table 2. Stimulus Materials, Scott Scenario illustrated with And-Sentences  
                                        PO                                                                NE                                                           IR 
HH  Scott is now turning on the warm water 
AND he will be warm soon.  
Scott is now making an effort to be 
tidy AND the bathroom will be 
dirtier than before he took his bath.  
Scott’s friends are now also going 
home to take a bath AND Scott will 
turn on the warm water.  
HL  Scott is now making an effort to be tidy 
AND the bathroom will be just as clean 
as before he took his bath.  
Scott is now turning on the warm 
water AND he will soon start to 
freeze even more.  
Scott’s friends are now also going 
home to take a bath AND Scott will 
turn on the cold water.  
LH  Scott is now bathing in a hot spring 
AND he will be warm soon.  
Scott is now turning on the cold 
water AND he will be warm soon.  
Scott’s friends are now participating 
in the Winter Olympics AND Scott 
will turn on the hot water.  
LL  Scott is now turning on the cold water 
AND he will soon start to freeze even 
more.  
Scott is now bathing in a hot spring 
AND he will soon start to freeze 
even more.  
Scott’s friends are now participating 
in the Winter Olympics AND Scott 
will turn on the cold water.  
Note. PO = positive relevance; NE = negative relevance; IR = irrelevance.  
 
The complete list of stimulus materials, R-scripts, and raw data can be found on the Open 
Science Framework: https://osf.io/yder9/. 
Modified Truth Table Task 
For each of the twelve priors×relevance within-participants conditions stemming from 
our experimental design, the participants were presented with two pages. The first page featured 
a modified version of the truth-table task. In typical implementations of the truth-table task 
participants are asked to evaluate the truth value of a conditional statement on the basis of an 
outcome statement describing a cell in the truth table (TT, TF, FT, FF) with either binary or 
ternary response options (Schroyens, 2010; Nickerson, 2015, pp. 38). In our modified version, 
the participants were asked for each trial to evaluate the truth value of a randomly chosen 
                                                                                                                                                             
introduction of a reversal condition to test for violations of commutativity, which was later 
dropped prior to launching the experiment, however. 
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sentence from our four target sentences (‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’) on 
the basis of two randomly chosen truth table cells.  
Since none of the truth tables reviewed in the introduction holds that speaker intentions 
and the Gricean maxims should play a role for the truth evaluation of the target sentences, we 
decided to test the participants’ truth evaluations under the relevance manipulation in a situation 
in which they would not have to worry about the speaker intentions behind uttering the strange 
IR items. To achieve this the participants were instructed that they should consider the target 
sentences as output produced by a computer program in the development phase in response to 
the scenario texts as input. A computer program in the development phase does not have any 
communicative intentions when producing odd sentences. Hence, calibrating its output based on 
truth values should increase a focus on truth evaluations of the sentences produced based solely 
on their content. The combination of naturalistic stimulus materials with our computer 
calibration task meant that the participants were encouraged to set aside concerns about speaker 
intentions behind the presented assertions and encouraged to use their background knowledge, 
underlying our manipulation of relevance, in evaluating their content. To illustrate, one 
participant might have seen the following scenario text: 
INPUT: Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He has now gone inside 
but is still freezing and takes a bath. As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is likely 
to make a mess in the process, which he knows his mother dislikes. 
with the following PO HH sentence presented as output produced by the computer: 
Computer output: Scott is now turning on the warm water BUT he 
will be warm soon. 
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To help the participants organize the information, the output sentences were distinguished by a 
different font, as illustrated above. Following the output sentences, two randomly chosen truth-
table cells were presented as continuations of the scenarios which occurred after the computer 
produced its output: 
Continuation: Scott turned on the warm water. He did become warm. 
On the basis of this continuation, the computer output turned out to be:  
True                False                Neither true nor false                  
As shown below, the task of the participants was then to help us calibrate the output sentences of 
the computer by evaluating, separately for each continuation, whether the output sentences were 
‘True’ (⊤), ‘False’ (⊥), or ‘Neither true nor false’ (NN) given the continuations of the scenario. 
The exact wording of the instruction was as follows: 
On each of 13 pages, you will read, in order, a short text describing a scenario, a 
sentence, and two different continuations of the scenario. For each case, we ask you to 
imagine that a computer has been given the scenario text as input and that it produced the 
sentence as output. The computer is still in the development phase and we need you to 
help us calibrate its output sentences. For each of the two possible continuations of the 
scenario, your task is to evaluate whether the sentence produced by the computer turned 
out to be 'True', 'False', or 'Neither true nor false' by the way the scenario developed. 
Before continuing to our 12 experimental conditions, the participants first saw a practice trial, 
which was later discarded in the analysis. 
On the second page, the participants were instructed to evaluate how confident they were 
in their responses on a scale from 0 % to 100 %. 
Procedures 
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To reduce the dropout rate once the proper experiment started, participants first went 
through three pages that: 1) stated our academic affiliations, 2) asked for personalized 
information (which was not paired with the participants’ other responses, however), 3) posed two 
SAT comprehension questions in a warm-up phase, and 4) presented a seriousness check 
emphasizing the importance of careful responses for the scientific utility of the results (Reips, 
2002). After a practice trial and a repetition of the instructions, the experiment itself began with 
the presentation of the twelve within-participants conditions. Their order was randomized anew 
for each participant. 
 
Results 
The observed response frequencies were analyzed with multinomial processing tree 
models (MPT; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988), a well-known class of models that provides a 
convenient testbed for hypothesis concerning categorical data. We will evaluate the MPT 
models’ absolute performance via the G² statistic (Read & Cressie, 1988) and their relative 
performance with the Fisher Information Approximation (FIA; Grünwald, 2007). FIA is a 
model-selection statistic that penalizes models according to their functional flexibility and 
improves upon traditional statistics such as AIC and BIC. Further details on the models and the 
analyses are provided in the Appendix. But it is worth to highlight here that the models assumed 
that individual’s responses are stochastic in the sense that they can fail to reflect their true 
judgments with some probability. When specifying the different hypotheses, we relied on the 
most lenient stochastic specification, which only imposes the constraint that the preferred 
response option should be the modal response. For example, in the case of the ⊤⊤ cell, the 
stochastic implementation of the material implication account then predicts that 
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P(⊤) ≥ P(⊥), P(NN) 
The reason behind the adoption of this specific stochastic specification is the diagnostic 
power associated with its failure, as any theory that fails to succeed under these minimal 
constraints faces a severe explanatory challenge. 
As can be seen from Figure 1 (right upper panel), aside from the ⊥⊥ cell, there does not 
appear to be much of a relevance effect for the truth evaluations of the indicative conditional. 
Indeed, for the true antecedent cells (⊤⊤, ⊤⊥), there appears to be an absolute majority for ⊤ and 
⊥ respectively across the different relevance levels, which is shared by all of the ABT sentences 
(‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’). It is only for the false antecedent cells (⊥⊤, ⊥⊥) that the 
indicative conditional seems to stand out from the ABT sentences. For the ABT sentences, there 
is an absolute majority of ⊥ responses for the false antecedent cases, whereas there is a mixed 
response for the indicative conditional with large differences across the relevance levels for the 
⊥⊥ cell with the indicative conditional. 
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Figure 1. Truth evaluations across sentences, relevance condition, and truth-table cells. 
Participants could respond ‘True’ (⊤), ‘False’ (⊥), or ‘Neither True nor False’ (NN). 
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The ABT Sentences 
We first tested whether response distributions differed across sentences and relevance levels. Our 
general approach for testing different hypothesis was the following: We fitted a set of 
constrained MPT models representing different hypotheses (e.g., response distributions do not 
differ across sentence levels), and compared their performance with an unconstrained model 
(Msaturated) that fits the data perfectly using one free parameter per degree of freedom provided by 
the data. An hypothesis (instantiated by a constrained model) is said to be rejected when it 
performs worse than the unconstrained model and/or any of the competing alternative hypotheses 
(even after taking differences in flexibility into account via FIA). 
For the ABT sentences, we considered four models: 1) Msaturated, which imposes no 
constraints whatsoever, 2) Msentence, which assumes that response probabilities are the same 
across sentences, but allows for differences across the different levels of the relevance factor, 3) 
Mrelevance, which assumes no differences across the relevance manipulation, but allows responses 
to differ across sentences, and 4) Mfull, which assumes no differences across both relevance and 
sentence levels. As shown in Table 3, the preferred model for the ABT sentences in terms of FIA 
was clearly Msentence. Note that FIA differences larger than 3.40 already indicate a very strong 
preference for the winning model (see Kellen, Klauer, & Bröder, 2013). In absolute terms, all 
models were rejected under a significance level of α = .05. However, it should be noted that 
when large samples are used, any minor deviation from model predictions can lead to a 
statistically-significant misfit, and having a p-value of .02 for Msentence can be considered 
satisfactory. In fact, in structural-equation modelling, which faces a similar problem of large 
samples in the interpretation of χ2 tests, a ratio χ2/df between 0 and 2 is considered to indicate a 
good fit (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003), and here G2/df = 1.49. 
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ABT Sentences and Indicative Conditionals 
When comparing the ABT sentences with the indicative conditionals (‘if-then’ sentences in 
Figure 1), we separated the true antecedent truth table cells from the false antecedent cells. In 
both cases, we considered three models: 1) Msaturated, 2) Msame, which assumes that responses to 
the ABT sentences are equal to the ones given to their indicative-conditional counterparts, and 3) 
Mdifferent, which assumes the same responses rates across the ABT sentences, but allows them to 
differ from the responses to the indicative conditionals. In the case of the true antecedent cells, 
Msame was the preferred model (see Table 4). In contrast, Mdifferent was preferred in the case of the 
false antecedent cells (see Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Model-Comparison Results: ABT 
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msentence 
Mrelevance 
Mfull 
0 
71.40 
237.51 
271.76 
0 
48 
48 
64 
1 
.02 
.00 
.00 
86.04 
0 
83.05 
50.84 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p = p-
value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA and the 
FIA from the best-performing model. 
Table 4. Model-Comparison Results: TT, TF, ABT + IF  
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msame 
Mdifferent 
0 
57.30 
31.84 
0 
36 
24 
1 
.01 
.13 
64.12 
0 
19.16 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p = p-
value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA and the FIA 
from the best-performing model. 
Table 5. Model-Comparison Results: FT, FF, ABT + IF  
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msame 
Mdifferent 
0 
243.73 
39.55 
0 
36 
24 
1 
.00 
.02 
40.98 
70.03 
0 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p = p-
value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA and the FIA 
from the best-performing model. 
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Indicative Conditionals and Truth Tables 
We now turn to an evaluation of the fit of truth tables in Table 1 for the indicative conditionals. 
As said, we will allow the models to predict that the expected responses constitute at least a 
relative majority (a very lenient requirement). The results reported in Table 6 show that none of 
the models was able to accurately characterize the individuals’ responses. Overall, the modal 
responses indicate a slight tendency to judge indicative conditionals as true whenever the 
antecedent and the consequent have the same truth status (in accordance with the truth table of 
the material bi-conditional, which is true in the ⊤⊤ and ⊥⊥ cells and false otherwise). This 
pattern is corroborated by the set of studies gathered by Schroyens (2010), which involved 
abstract stimulus materials with explicit negations and the option to respond that the truth table 
cell is ‘irrelevant’ for the truth value of the conditional (see Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Goodness-of-Fit Results  
Truth-Conditional Inferentialism 
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
73.12 (⊤) 
107.41 (⊤) 
193.88 (⊥) 
0.00 
0.00 
171.94 (⊥)  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Material Implication Account 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
171.94 (⊥) 
96.58 (⊥) 
147.56 (⊥) 
0.00 
12.64 (⊥) 
2.09 (⊥) 
De Finetti Table 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
43.44 (⊥) 
40.47 (⊥) 
28.31 (⊥) 
10.70 (⊤) 
30.92 (⊥) 
5.87 (⊥) 
Note. Values correspond to the G2 statistic. The symbols in 
parentheses (⊤, ⊥, N) indicate the observed modal response in 
case the model prediction failed. All values above 2.71 are 
rejected (p < .05) according to the most conservative ?̅?2 
distribution (Self & Liang, 1987).   
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Confidence Ratings 
All the confidence ratings were in the interval [76%, 81%]. For the ‘therefore’-sentences, the 
participants were more confident in the PO (mean = 80.28, SD = 19.54) condition than in the NE 
(mean = 78.27, SD = 21.85), V = 60142, pH < .05, r = -.11,4  and IR (mean = 75.97, SD = 22.60) 
conditions, V = 66528, pH < .0001, r = -.21. But these were small effects and the participants 
continued to remain highly confident in the truth values they provided even when these 
conflicted with the reason-relation readings of the ‘therefore’-sentences. For the ‘but’-sentences, 
the participants were no more confident in the NE (mean = 78.48, SD = 21.60) condition than 
they were in the PO (mean = 78.14, SD = 21.89) condition, V = 54333, pH = .53, r = -.027. For 
the indicative conditionals, the participants were more confident in the PO (mean = 78.74, SD = 
20.65) condition than they were in the IR (mean = 76.01, SD = 22.53) condition, V = 61801, pH 
< .05, r = -.12, but no more confident than they were in the NE (mean = 76.42, SD = 21.90) 
condition, V = 63538, pH = .074, r = -.089. Again, these were small effects and the participants 
continued to remain highly confident in the truth values they provided even when these 
conflicted with the reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals. 
 
 
                                                 
4  We controlled for the family-wise error rate using the Bonferroni-Holm correction 
(indicated by the index "H"). 
Table 7. Data from Schroyens’ (2010) Meta-Analysis  
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
Irrelevant 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
0% 
5% 
77% 
18% 
64% 
0% 
36% 
Note. Values correspond to percentage of studies (out of a subset 
of 22 studies with abstract stimulus material and ‘irrelevant’ as 
third response option) in Schroyens’ (2010) meta-analysis in which 
a specific response was modal.   
Running head: Relevance Effects                                  26 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that there are significant effects of relevance on 
response probabilities in truth evaluations for each of the ABT sentences. But these effects are 
minor judging from Figure 1. It is possible that some of the small differences observed are due to 
heterogeneity at the individual level as well as at the level of the stimulus material (e.g., Rouder 
et al., 2008). Moreover, the model comparison in Table 3 shows that the preferred model neither 
assumes a difference between these three sentence types, nor in terms of how they are affected 
by the relevance manipulation. Accordingly, the results do not support the idea that conventional 
implicatures (“therefore” conveying PO; “but” conveying NE) affect truth-table evaluations. 
Instead a common truth-table semantics of the ABT emerged in line with H0_ABT, as derived from 
the Frege-Grice tradition, and effects of relevance on their shared truth table were small. 
This finding was also supported by the high confidence ratings across conditions. Even in 
conditions where conflicts between truth evaluations based on logical conjunction and the 
reason-relation reading of the ABT sentences were induced, the participants indicated that they 
had a confidence of 76% or higher on average in their truth-value judgments.  
In addition, the results indicate that none of the truth tables for indicative conditionals 
outlined in Table 1 are able to capture the patterns in the data for indicative conditionals, even 
when applying the most lenient test (i.e. that the deterministic truth tables only have to predict 
the relative, rather than absolute, majority responses). As shown in Table 6, the de Finetti table 
and the material implication are much better suited to capture the modal responses in the true 
antecedent cases than truth-conditional inferentialism.5 In comparison, truth-conditional 
                                                 
5  As noted in Footnote 2, Karolina Krzyżanowska has in discussion expressed doubts about 
whether the truth conditional inferentialism is really committed to predicting ‘True’ for the ⊤⊥ 
cell in the positive relevance condition—not least due to the context-sensitive interpretation of 
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inferentialism does a much better job in the false antecedent cases, where the de Finetti table and 
the material implication encountered difficulties. Indeed, although the defective truth table effect 
is often cited in the literature as strong evidence in favor of the de Finetti table (Over & Evans, 
2003), neither the results reported in Table 6 with realistic stimulus material nor the results 
reported in Table 7 with abstract stimulus materials support the assumption that ‘Neither true nor 
false’ is the modal response in the false antecedent cases.   
Interestingly, Figure 1 does indicate the presence of a relevance effect on the truth 
evaluations of the indicative conditional in the ⊥⊥ cell, which is compatible with the truth table 
for truth-conditional inferentialism (see Table 1). 
However, the gross failure of the predictions in Table 1 to account for the data of 
Experiment 1 suggests the possibility of some kind of within-subject variation with respect to the 
truth tables the participants rely on. Indeed, it is possible that a mixture of truth tables (inter alia, 
the bi-conditional table and the de Finetti table) would have to be invoked to account for our 
results. However, the present data suggest that it would have to be a small proportion of the 
individuals that follow the de Finetti table. The proportion of ‘NN’ responses in the false-
antecedent cells for ‘if-then’ sentences hardly exceeds 33%, suggesting that no more than a third 
of the individuals in these cells of the experimental design responded in accordance with the de 
Finetti table. Moreover, such a mixture account is not able to account for the relevance effect 
found for the ⊥⊥ cell, captured by truth-conditional inferentialism. Follow-up studies better 
suited for testing individual variation that have the participants fill out all four truth table cells 
                                                                                                                                                             
the indicative conditional voiced in Krzyżanowska et al. (2014). However, even when taking this 
point into account, it is not clear to how the theory could be adjusted to successfully 
accommodate an absolute majority of ‘True’ responses in the ⊤⊤ cell for the NE and IR 
conditions.  
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for each sentence (perhaps multiple times in order to estimate response-error probabilities) would 
be needed to investigate this possibility.  
 
Experiment 2 
Given that no difference was found among the ABT sentences in Experiment 1, we 
wanted to see in Experiment 2 whether a dissociation between these sentences occurs when they 
are evaluated in the context of a probability-judgment task and an acceptability-ranking task. 
According to the reason-relation reading, ‘φ but ψ’ expresses that φ lowers the probability of ψ 
(∆p < 0), and ‘φ therefore ψ’ expresses that φ raises the probability of ψ (∆p > 0). In contrast, ‘φ 
and ψ’ can suggest that φ raises the probability of ψ, but according to its reading as logical 
conjunction ‘φ & ψ’, φ need not affect the probability of ψ at all.  
Hence, we expected that when presented with the ⊤⊤ cell, the acceptability ratings would 
accord with the following pattern, where ‘φ and ψ’ acts as a baseline:  
(NE)   φ but ψ ≻ φ and ψ ≻ φ therefore ψ   (b ≻ a ≻ t)  
(PO)   φ therefore ψ ≻ φ and ψ ≻ φ but ψ   (t ≻ a ≻ b) 
(IR)   φ and ψ / φ but ψ ≻ φ therefore ψ  (b/a ≻ t) 
Moreover, on the assumption that ‘φ but ψ’ expresses that φ is assumed to be a sufficient reason 
against ψ, and that ‘φ therefore ψ’ expresses that φ is assumed to be a sufficient reason for ψ, we 
would expect P(ψ | φ) = high/low to act as a moderator variable. That is to say, we expect the 
pattern b ≻ a ≻ t to be more frequent in NE when P(ψ | φ) = low compared to P(ψ | φ) = high, 
and t  ≻ a ≻ b to be more frequent in PO when P(ψ | φ) = high as compared to P(ψ | φ) = low. 
As a manipulation check, we tested whether the effect of the relevance manipulation on 
P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) from Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) replicates despite 
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the procedural change that our conditionals had the form of ‘if φ is now happening, then ψ will 
occur’ as opposed to ‘if φ occurs, then ψ will occur’ (see Footnote 3). In addition, we tested 
whether a similar moderation of P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ but ψ), P(φ and ψ), and P(φ 
therefore ψ) could be found for our ABT sentences with the expectation that the marginal means 
would be higher in the NE condition compared to the PO condition for P(φ but ψ), and that the 
marginal means of P(φ therefore ψ) would be higher in the PO condition compared to the NE and 
IR conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Like Experiment 1, the experiment was conducted over the Internet. A total of 805 people 
completed the experiment. The participants were sampled through the Internet platform 
Mechanical Turk from USA, UK, and Australia and paid a small amount of money for their 
participation. The same exclusion criteria were applied as in Experiment 1. The final sample thus 
consisted of 593 participants. Mean age was 39 years, ranging from 18 to 80 years; 32% of the 
participants were male; 73% indicated that the highest level of education that they had completed 
was an undergraduate degree or higher. The demographic measures of the participants differed 
only minimally before and after the exclusion. 
Design 
Experiment 2 had the same experimental design as Experiment 1 for the probability task. 
In contrast, the acceptability task only differed by presenting the participants with three levels of 
the sentence factor (‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, ‘…therefore…’).    
Materials and Procedure  
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The procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 unless otherwise stated. For each of the 
twelve priors×relevance within-participants conditions, the participants were presented with four 
pages. The first page featured only the scenario text. The participants were instructed that the 
scenario text had been supplied as input to a computer program in the development phase 
(following the instructions from Experiment 1). The second page asked the participants both to 
evaluate the probability of the antecedent (e.g. ‘Scott is now turning on the warm water’) and of 
the consequent (e.g. ‘Scott will be warm soon’) conditional on the antecedent on a slider with a 
scale from 0 to 100%. The instruction for evaluating the conditional probability was as follows: 
Suppose Scott is now turning on the warm water. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is true on a scale 
from 0 to 100%: 
Scott will be warm soon. 
The third page asked the participants to evaluate the probability of a randomly chosen member of 
our four target sentences (‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’). Continuing with 
our example of a PO HH condition from the Scott scenario, one participant might be asked to 
evaluate the probability of the ‘but’ sentence as follows: 
Could you please rate the probability that the following sentence is true on a scale from 0 
to 100 %: 
Scott is now turning on the warm water, BUT Scott will be warm soon. 
On page four the participants were presented with the acceptability task. Inspired by the task of 
evaluating the categorical acceptability of conditionals in Douven & Verbrugge (2012), we 
introduced the novel task of rank-ordering the acceptability of the ABT sentences given the ⊤⊤ 
cell with the computer program calibration instructions from Experiment 1. That is to say, the 
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participants were presented with the scenario text, which they had been instructed to regard as 
input to a computer program. They were then presented with the ⊤⊤ cell as a continuation of the 
scenario, which took place after the computer program had produced its output sentences. The 
task was to evaluate which of the three ABT sentences was most acceptable in light of the 
continuation of the scenario. Continuing with the example from above: 
Continuation: Scott turned on the warm water. Scott did get warm.  
 
Please order the OUTPUT in terms of how acceptable they are in light of the 
continuations of the scenarios. Click on the most acceptable output for rank 1, the second 
most acceptable for rank 2, and the third most acceptable for rank 3. Note that the 
responses can be deselected.  
 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water, BUT Scott will be warm 
soon. 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water AND Scott will be warm 
soon. 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water THEREFORE Scott will be 
warm soon. 
As in Experiment 1, the computer output sentences were distinguished by a different font to help 
the participants organize the information. Finally, the participants were asked to indicate whether 
they agree with the statement that at least one of the output sentences was acceptable given the 
continuation.   
The instructions presented after the practice trial followed Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) 
in giving the following explication of how ‘acceptable’ was meant to be understood: 
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Please note that when we ask – here and throughout the study – how ‘acceptable’ a 
statement is, we are not interested in whether the statement is grammatically correct, 
unsurprising, or whether it would offend anybody. Rather we ask you to make a judgment 
about the adequacy of the information conveyed by the statement. More speciﬁcally, we 
ask you to judge whether the statement would be a reasonable thing to say in the context 
provided by the scenarios and their continuations.  
 
Results 
Acceptability 
We excluded rank orders for which participants found none of the output sentences to be 
categorically acceptable (24%).6 Table 8 reports the rank order of the sentences from the 
acceptability task. Overall, the results matched our predictions, with the rank order t ≻ a ≻ b 
occurring most often in PO, b ≻ a ≻ t occurring most often in NE, and a ≻ b ≻ t occurring most 
often in IR. Another prediction corroborated by the data was that in PO, t ≻ a ≻ b occurred less 
often when the participants judged P(ψ | φ) to be low. Indeed, the proportion of t ≻ a ≻ b ranks 
was larger (66%) when P(ψ | φ) ≥ .50 than when P(ψ | φ) < .50 (53%), a difference that was 
found to be statistically significant (∆G2 = 25.51, p < .001, ∆FIA = 10.29). Conversely, we 
predicted that in NE, b ≻ a ≻ t would occur more often when P(ψ | φ) was judged to be low 
rather than high, a difference that was also found in the data (74% versus 66%; ∆G² = 9.85, p = 
.001, ∆FIA = 2.44). 
 
                                                 
6  Note that the ranking distributions did not differ qualitatively, when including rankings 
for which participants found none of the sentences to be acceptable. However, the increase of b ≻ 
a ≻ t in the NE condition when P(ψ | φ) < .50 was no longer significant (p = .06). 
Running head: Relevance Effects                                  33 
 
The interactions between sentence levels and relevance levels in determining the 
preferred rank orders shown in bold in Table 8 are of such magnitude that a statistical analysis is 
superfluous; their prominence is too severe to leave any doubt.  
Probability Judgments 
According to Figure 2 (see panels in the second row from the top), the results from Skovgaard-
Olsen et al. (2016a) for P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) across relevance levels appear to 
be replicated. In comparison to Figure 1 in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a), the intercept is 
slightly larger and less points fall on the diagonal in the present Figure 2. But the overall 
tendency is the same: There is a stronger relationship between P(ψ | φ) and P(if φ, then ψ) for the 
PO condition than for the IR condition in particular and the marginal mean (i.e. the overall level 
of the set of points on the y axis) of P(if φ, then ψ) is higher in the PO condition than in the NE 
and IR conditions, across the scale of P(ψ | φ). For the IR and NE conditions there is a substantial 
portion of data points assigning probabilities almost equal to zero to ‘if φ, then ψ’ across 
variations in P(ψ | φ). This same tendency is visible in the probability evaluations in Figure 2 
(top row) for ‘φ therefore ψ’ with P(φ & ψ) as a predictor; only this time the differences in 
Table 8. Percentage of rank orders in the acceptability task    
 φ/ψ Priors  a ≻ b ≻ t a ≻ t ≻ b b ≻ a ≻ t t ≻ a ≻ b b ≻ t ≻ a t ≻ b ≻ a 
 
PO 
 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
3% 
5% 
1% 
4% 
31% 
28% 
23% 
19% 
1% 
5% 
1% 
5% 
62% 
54% 
71% 
64% 
1% 
4% 
2% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
3% 
4% 
 
NE 
 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
8% 
6% 
10% 
7% 
4% 
4% 
10% 
3% 
73% 
74% 
66% 
74% 
5% 
5% 
7% 
4% 
9% 
8% 
6% 
10% 
1% 
3% 
1% 
3% 
 
IR 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
49% 
52% 
57% 
53% 
35% 
19% 
19% 
22% 
6% 
23% 
15% 
14% 
8% 
3% 
4% 
7% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
Note. φ = the antecedent (or first conjunct); ψ = the consequent (or second conjunct). The operator ≻ denotes 
“more acceptable than”. ‘a’ = ‘and’, ‘b’ = ‘but’, and ‘t’ = ‘therefore’. 
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intercept and marginal means between PO and the IR and NE conditions appear to be even more 
pronounced. In Figure 2 (third row from top), it moreover seems that P(φ & ψ) is a good 
predictor of P(φ and ψ) across relevance levels, with a higher intercept in the PO condition. 
Finally, P(φ & ψ) appears to best predict P(φ but ψ) for the NE condition. In contrast, in the PO 
condition there appears to be only a very weak relationship between P(φ & ψ) and P(φ but ψ). 
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        Figure 2. Probability evaluations of the sentence types across relevance levels 
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Note. P(φ & ψ) is plotted as a predictor of P(φ therefore/and/but ψ) across relevance levels (rows 1, 3, and 
4). P(ψ | φ) is plotted as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) across relevance levels (row 2). Raw data values 
(plotted with 80% transparency) and LMM linear effect of the predictors on P(φ therefore ψ) (row 1), P(if 
φ, then ψ) (row 2), P(φ and ψ) (row 3), and P(φ but ψ) (row 4) across relevance manipulations (PO = left 
column, NE = center column, IR = right column). The confidence bands show the 95% confidence region 
of the effect of the two independent variables, P(φ & ψ) and P(ψ | φ). 
 
This pattern was confirmed in an LMM analysis (see Appendix for details). Main effects 
of P(ψ | φ) as predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ & ψ) as predictor of the ABT sentences were 
found, F(1, 18.4) = 1095.21, p < .0001. Also, a main effect of the relevance conditions was 
found, F(2, 12.3) = 99.24, p < .0001, as well as an interaction between the P(ψ | φ)/P(φ & ψ) 
predictors and the relevance conditions, F(2, 13) = 10.20, p < .01. Main effects for the sentence 
type, and interactions between sentence type and the other predictors, were also found.  
 Follow-up analyses for P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) showed that the slope 
found in the PO condition (b = 0.61, 95%-CI = [0.54, 0.69]), was significantly larger than the 
slope in the IR condition (b = 0.32, 95%-CI = [0.26, 0.39]), z = 5.99, pT < .001, but was not 
significantly larger than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.51, 95%-CI = [0.43, 0.58]), z = 
2.02, pT = .68. The subscript ‘T’ indicates p-value correction by the Tukey method for comparing 
a family of 12 estimates for all follow-up analyses. 
Follow-up analysis for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ therefore ψ) showed that the slope 
in the PO condition (b = 0.43, 95%-CI = [0.36, 0.49]) was neither significantly larger than the 
slope in the IR condition (b = 0.35, 95%-CI = [0.27, 0.43]), z = 1.40, pT = .97, nor significantly 
smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.49, 95%-CI = [0.40, 0.58]), z = -1.11, pT = .99.  
Furthermore, follow-up analyses for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ and ψ) showed that 
the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.56, 95%-CI = [0.49, 0.64]) was both significantly smaller 
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than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.79, 95%-CI = [0.71, 0.87]), z = -4.30, pT < .01, and 
significantly smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.81, 95%-CI = [0.72, 0.90]), z = -
4.15, pT < .01. 
Finally, a follow-up analysis for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ but ψ) showed that the 
slope in the PO condition (b = 0.25, 95%-CI = [0.18, 0.32]) was both significantly smaller than 
the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.52, 95%-CI = [0.44, 0.59]), z = -5.07, pT < .0001, and 
significantly smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.81, 95%-CI = [0.72, 0.91), z = -
9.24, pT < .0001. 
Differences in estimated marginal means for the four target sentences were tested for 
their statistical significance at the three scale points of the independent variables (P(ψ | φ) for 
P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ & ψ) for P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)) in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Differences in Estimated Marginal Means  
Sentence Relevance IV = 0% IV = 50% IV = 100% 
P(if φ, then ψ) 
 
 
P(φ therefore ψ)   
 
 
P(φ and ψ) 
PO 
NE 
IR 
PO 
NE 
IR 
PO 
NE 
32.6%        
4.0%    *** 
6.3%    *** 
53.6%   
6.8%    *** 
7.4%    *** 
42.9% 
12.6%  *** 
63.3% 
29.2%   *** 
22.4%   *** 
79.9% 
31.2%   *** 
24.9%   *** 
71.1% 
53.0%   *** 
93.9%   
54.4%   *** 
38.4%   *** 
96.1% 
55.6%   *** 
42.4%   *** 
99.3% 
93.5%    
 IR 21.3%  ***  60.8%   * 100% 
P(φ but ψ) PO 
NE 
IR 
33.2% 
20.6%  * 
21.4%  . 
45.8% 
61.2%   *** 
47.2% 
58.4% 
100%    *** 
73.0% 
Note. Differences for the Estimated Marginal Means for the four sentence 
levels were tested for their statistical significance across the following 
scale points of the independent variables (IV = P(ψ | φ) for P(if φ, then ψ) 
and IV = P(φ & ψ) for P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)): 0%, 50%, and 100%. The 
pairwise contrasts indicate whether the NE or IR conditions differed 
significantly from the PO condition using z-ratios and adjusted p-values 
through Tukey’s method for comparing a family of 36 estimates.                                               
Signif. codes: ‘***’ .001, ‘**’ .01, ‘*’ .05, ‘.’ .1.    
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As Table 9 shows, the estimated marginal means of P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ therefore ψ) 
were consistently statistically higher in the PO condition than in the NE and IR conditions across 
the probability scales of their respective independent variables. In contrast, the estimated 
marginal means of P(φ and ψ) was only significantly higher in the PO condition than in the NE 
and IR conditions at P(φ & ψ) = 0% and P(φ & ψ) = 50%. And finally, the estimated marginal 
means of P(φ but ψ) was only significantly higher in the PO condition than in the NE condition 
at P(φ & ψ) = 0%. For P(φ & ψ) = 50% and P(φ & ψ) = 100%, the estimated marginal means of 
P(φ but ψ) were significantly higher in the NE condition than in the PO condition. 
Discussion 
The results obtained in Experiment 2 show an unmistakable pattern. Participants rank 
ordered the acceptability of the ABT sentences given the continuation of the scenario in the ⊤⊤ 
cell. We predicted that ‘φ but ψ’ differs from the ‘φ and ψ’ baseline in being more preferable in 
NE, and that ‘φ therefore ψ’ differs from the ‘φ and ψ’ baseline in being more preferable in PO. 
The predicted rank orders clearly dominate the other possible rank orders in the data. 
Furthermore, P(ψ | φ) moderates the relationship between the rank order acceptabilities and the 
relevance levels in the manner one would expect, if ‘φ but ψ’ expresses that φ is a sufficient 
reason against ψ and ‘φ therefore ψ’ expresses that φ is a sufficient reason for ψ. 
This basic finding is corroborated by the results from the probability evaluation task 
outlined in Table 9. Consistent with the reading of ‘if φ, then ψ’ and ‘φ therefore ψ’ as indicating 
that φ is a reason for ψ, the estimated marginal means for P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ therefore ψ) in 
the PO condition were invariantly higher than the estimated marginal means in the NE and IR 
conditions, across the scale of their respective independent variables. Moreover, consistent with 
the reading of ‘φ but ψ’ as indicating that φ is a reason against ψ, the estimated marginal means 
Running head: Relevance Effects                                  39 
for P(φ but ψ) was higher in the NE condition than in the PO condition at P(φ & ψ) = 50% and 
P(φ & ψ) = 100%.  
General Discussion 
Given the large sample sizes and high power for detecting even small differences, the 
finding from Experiment 1 that the (relative) response frequencies of the ABT sentences can be 
set equal across sentence levels, and that relevance does not interact with the sentence factor, is a 
strong and in fact surprising result. It suggests that the ABT sentences have exactly the same 
truth conditions. Taken together, Experiment 1 and 2 show a clear dissociation between 
evaluations of truth, probability, and acceptability. Relevance interacts with the sentence factor 
(and, but, therefore) in the rank-order acceptability task and the probability evaluation task as 
expected, but does not interact with the sentence factor in the truth-evaluation task. In fact, truth 
evaluations of the ABT sentences could be set equal across sentences in that task with only 
minor losses in goodness of fit. The fact that Table 8 and 9 display such strong interaction 
effects, when the participants are asked to rank order the acceptability and provide probability 
evaluations, makes the absence of an interaction of relevance and sentence in the truth-table task 
even more surprising. It suggests that there is a deeply entrenched modularization and little 
cross-talk between the processes and/or representations tapped by the tasks in Experiments 1 and 
2. 
These findings suggest that the Frege-Grice tradition was right in its assumption that the 
difference in reason-relation readings of these sentences does not affect their truth evaluations. 
Instead, Grice (1989) conjectured that the differences of the ABT sentences would be part of 
their conventional implicatures. In support of this, Experiment 2 found the signature effects of 
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the reason-relation readings in the orderings of the ABT sentences according to their 
acceptability, as also corroborated in the probability judgments.  
Finally, the fact that we were able to find strong effects of the relevance manipulation in 
the expected directions for the ABT sentences in Experiment 2 suggests that the absence of such 
a difference in Experiment 1 is not an artifact of the stimulus material (see Footnote 3) nor of the 
instructions of the computer-calibration task. 
Turning to indicative conditionals, the results from Experiment 1 on the truth evaluations 
of the indicative conditional present an explanatory challenge, as none of the investigated truth 
tables were able to account for the patterns found. We found that there is a marked relevance 
effect on the truth evaluations of the indicative conditional in the ⊥⊥ cell. This finding 
challenges the H0_IF assumption underlying the material implication account and the de Finetti 
truth table, which holds that truth evaluations of the indicative conditional are not affected by 
relevance manipulations. Moreover, it was shown that in spite of its recent popularity in 
psychology of reasoning (Baratgin, Politzer, and Over, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013; Elqayam and Over, 
2013), the de Finetti truth table lacks support for its distinguishing feature: The prediction of 
‘Neither true nor false’ evaluations in the false antecedent cases neither found support in 
Experiment 1 nor in the 22 studies with abstract stimulus material from the Schroyens (2010) 
meta-analysis presented in Table 7. 
In contrast, truth-conditional inferentialism correctly rejects H0_IF, but there is little 
support for its alternative predictions. In particular, truth-conditional inferentialism faced 
problems accounting for our results in the true antecedent cells, yet it was compatible with the 
relevance effect found in the ⊥⊥ cell. 
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It is remarkable that none of the investigated theories was able to fit the data even under 
the most lenient stochastic interpretation of their deterministic truth tables, whereby they only 
had to predict the relative-majority responses of the participants (see the Appendix for further 
discussion). A stricter interpretation would have imposed the requirement that the absolute 
majority responses were predicted by the theories, or by admitting relatively small “error” rates 
(e.g., 10%). As noted, it is possible that the data pattern of truth evaluations of the indicative 
conditional across relevance manipulations is best accounted for by a mixture of truth tables. It is 
up to future experiments better suited to testing for individual variation to explore this 
possibility.  
However, a different perspective on our results is also possible. A non-truth functional 
conditional is a conditional whose truth value cannot be determined by the truth values of its 
parts. As Rescher (2007, p. 43) points out, for any non-truth functional conditional that is 
logically stronger than ‘⊃’, it holds that “we can say nothing about the truth status of p → q 
without a deeper look at the specifics of the matter”. It is therefore possible to interpret our 
results as indicating that indicative conditionals are non-truth functional with further parameters 
determining their truth values in the false antecedent cases. If the participants set these 
parameters differently, then mixed results, like those found in Figure 1, may be the outcome.    
Interestingly, David Over (personal communication, 2017) suggested one such 
possibility. According to the Jeffrey truth table, the value in the ⊥⊥ cells is not NN but rather 
P(ψ | φ) (Jeffrey, 1991; Over and Baratgin, 2017). Conjoined with the auxiliary hypothesis that 
some participants interpret ‘true’ pleonastically as simply expressing endorsement (Edgington, 
2003; Over et al., 2007), these participants might respond with ⊤ when P(ψ | φ) = high, NN 
when P(ψ | φ) = middle and with ⊥ when P(ψ | φ) = low. In addition, Evans & Over (2004) have 
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suggested that there may be conditions in which the participants supplement ‘if φ, then ψ’ with 
‘if ψ, then φ’ yielding a bi-conditional event interpretation, which in turn could also be 
interpreted according to the Jeffrey table (Over and Baratgin, 2017). Further work is needed to 
test these intriguing possibilities. 
Potential Limitations 
When evaluating our results it is important to keep the following points in mind. First, when 
asking the participants to calibrate the output of a computer program, the aim was to create a 
situation in which the participants would not naturally begin interpreting communicative 
intentions behind producing assertions with irrelevant components and reconstruct speaker 
meaning. It turns out that such an approach has a track-record in the literature. For instance, 
Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991) employ a conceptually similar manipulation to set 
aside Gricean conversational norms (for discussion see Lee, 2006). Moreover, Doran, Ward, 
Larson, McNabb, and Baker (2012) achieved a similar effect by asking the participants to 
provide truth-value judgments based on adopting the perspective of someone, who is only able to 
understand the literal content of what has been said. Finally, in Wright and Wells (1988) an 
attempt was undertaken to control for demand characteristics relating to the Gricean ideal of 
cooperative discourse in the attitude-attribution paradigm by instructing the participants that the 
set of questionnaire items they were presented with had been randomly selected from a larger 
pool.   
 In Doran et al. (2012) confidence ratings are moreover used as a measure of task 
complexity, because confidence ratings have been found to be inversely correlated with 
perceived task complexity. In the truth-table task in Experiment 1, all mean confidence ratings 
were in the interval [76%, 81%], which indicates that the participants were highly confident of 
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judgments across all conditions. Indeed, the participants continued to remain highly confident of 
their responses even when judging truth values based on logical connectives and reason relation 
constraints would have led to conflicting responses.  
For the rank-ordering of acceptability and probability evaluations in Experiment 2, we 
retained the computer program instruction to discourage participants from looking for some 
hidden intention for why an irrelevance item had been asserted and to encourage a focus on 
rating the sentences for their acceptability and probability under different conditions. 
Note, finally, that the differences between the findings in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
cannot merely be attributed to the presence of a forced choice format or dependencies in the rank 
ordering task, since the probability evaluation task in Experiment 2 produced similar results 
without having a forced-choice format. Moreover, even if one restricts the attention to the most 
preferred sentence in each of the relevance conditions, because one is worried that the choices 
are not independent, a very clear pattern emerges: in the PO condition, the therefore-sentences 
are by far the most acceptable sentences, in the NE condition, the but-sentences are by far the 
most acceptable sentences, and in the IR condition the and-sentences are by far the most 
acceptable sentences. This pattern is in agreement with the reason-relation reading of these 
sentences and it is also one that is mirrored in the probability evaluations.  
 
Conclusion 
In the Frege-Grice tradition of applying logic as a model of natural language connectives, 
it is assumed that the difference in reason-relation readings of the sentences ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, 
and ‘φ therefore ψ’ does not affect their truth conditions. Support for this assumption was found 
in Experiment 1. In contrast, Experiment 2 indicated a dissociation between the effects of 
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relevance on ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’ in truth evaluations and in evaluations of 
their acceptability and probabilities. For, when the participants are asked to rank order the 
acceptability of ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’ on the basis of the ⊤⊤ cell, the different 
rank orders predicted by a reason-relation reading of each sentence are strongly preferred. 
Moreover, their probability evaluations accord with the reason-relation reading. Turning to the 
indicative conditionals, a relevance effect on truth evaluations was found, and neither the truth 
tables supplied by the material implication, the popular de Finetti table, nor truth-conditional 
inferentialism were able to account for these results of Experiment 1, even under the most lenient 
stochastic interpretation of their predictions. Accordingly, the results for the truth evaluations of 
indicative conditionals across relevance levels from Experiment 1 present an explanatory 
challenge for further theorizing and empirical work to solve.  
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Appendix: Statistical Analyses 
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Experiment 1: MPT Analysis 
The observed response frequencies in Experiment 1 were analyzed with multinomial processing 
tree models (MPT; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988). The Models were fitted with R package MPTinR 
(Singmann & Kellen, 2013). The MPT framework is typically used to characterize the mixtures 
of processes and cognitive states that underlie individuals’ categorical responses (for reviews, 
see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). However, they can also be used to directly 
test hypotheses at the level of the observed response distributions through goodness of fit and 
model-selection statistics (e.g., Birnbaum, 2013; Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014; Karabatsos, 2005; 
Klauer & Kellen, 2011, 2015; Klauer, Singmann, & Kellen, 2015). We will evaluate the models’ 
absolute performance via the G² statistic (Read & Cressie, 1988) and their relative performance 
with the Fisher Information Approximation (FIA; Grünwald, 2007). Where traditional model-
selection statistics such as Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (Burnham & Anderson, 
2002)  rely on the number of parameters as a proxy for model complexity, FIA penalizes models 
according to their functional flexibility. 
In the present study, the different theories establish distinct predictions for the truth 
evaluations. For example, according to the material-implication account, individuals should 
consider the ⊤⊤, ⊥⊤, and ⊥⊥ cells of the truth table as true (⊤), but deem the ⊤⊥ cell false (⊥). 
These predictions are deterministic in the sense that no other response is considered possible. 
The deterministic nature of axiomatic accounts represents a long-standing problem in 
psychology due to the need to recast these accounts in order to accommodate the stochastic 
nature of responses with respect to an experiment’s empirical sample space (e.g., Luce, 1995, 
1997; Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2011). For example, the predictions of the material-
implication account for the ⊤⊤ cell of the truth table would then be relaxed in order to allow 
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false or NN responses with some probability. The exact manner of relaxation is not entirely clear 
though. For example, one could assume that individuals almost invariably respond true (e.g., 
90% of the times), or alternatively that true responses constitute an absolute or a relative 
majority, among other possibilities. This issue has been thoroughly explored in studies focusing 
on whether preferences are transitive (when an individual prefers A to B, and B to C, then A is 
expected to be preferred to C), in which different stochastic implementations have been 
considered (e.g. weak, moderate, and strong stochastic transitivity, the triangle inequality; see 
Regenwetter et al., 2011). In the present case we adopted what we view as the most lenient 
stochastic implementation; to wit, that the predicted response should occur at last as often as 
each of the other responses (i.e., that it should enjoy at least a relative majority). The reason is 
the diagnostic power associated to its failure, as any theory that fails to succeed under these 
minimal constraints should be seriously questioned. Note that this stochastic specification is 
completely agnostic regarding the nature of the deviations from the predictions: Individuals 
might commit “errors” due to a misreading of the sentences, a failure in their evaluation, or a 
motor-response error, among other possibilities (see Birnbaum, 2013). 
 
Experiment 2: LMM Analysis 
For Experiment 2, a mixed linear model was fitted to the data with fully crossed fixed effects for 
the predictor (IV: P(ψ | φ) and P(φ & ψ)), relevance condition (PO, NE, and IR), and sentence 
type (P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)) and crossed random effects for participants 
and scenarios. In lme4 syntax (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), the LMM used took 
the following form:  
DV ~ IV * relevance * sentence_type  + (IV * relevance | participant)                                 
+ (IV * relevance | scenario)  
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The R package afex (Singmann et al., 2016) was used to obtain the statistical significance of the 
fixed effects while controlling for variability due to participants and scenarios. 
